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The Smokescreen Problem in Abortion 
Jurisprudence: How the Undue Burden 
Standard and Long-Term Legislative 
Tactics Allow Courts to Turn a Blind Eye to 
True Legislative Intent 
Lucy Downing* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of abortion has been passionately debated in this country for 
many years.  For decades, our legal system has recognized that legitimate 
interests in the subject lie with both women and the State.1  From the time the 
right of free choice was found to be granted by our Constitution in Roe v. 
Wade, however, the legal standard with which to assess these competing 
interests has been a source of debate and confusion.2  Abortion is undoubtedly 
an issue that implicates deeply rooted moral considerations for many people, 
but the United States Supreme Court has carefully undertaken the 
responsibility of formulating rules that insulate certain moral beliefs from 
legal analyses of abortion.3 
In Roe, the Court articulated the first standard used to assess abortion 
regulations: the trimester framework.4  In short, this standard defined when 
within a woman’s pregnancy a state may act and which purpose it may further 
while doing so.5  Due to the rigidity of the trimester framework, the Court 
articulated a new standard almost twenty years later in Planned Parenthood 
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 1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 2. Brendan T. Beery, Tiered Balancing and the Fate of Roe v. Wade: How 
the New Supreme Court Majority Could Turn the Undue-Burden Standard into a 
Deferential Pike Test, 28 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 402–406 (2019). 
 3. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
 4. Id. at 164–65. 
 5. Id. 
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of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey: the undue burden standard.6  This 
standard remains today and allows state regulation at any point in pregnancy, 
so long as the regulation is not unduly burdensome to women seeking an 
abortion.   
The abortion debate has become more polarized since Roe, and state 
 legislatures have taken increasingly aggressive measures in limiting abortion 
to the greatest extent possible under the existing legal framework.7  Further, 
the undue burden standard set out in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey is unclear in many ways, specifically on how courts 
should assess the burden of anti-abortion legislation when it offers no true 
purpose other than to incrementally put an end to the abortion right.8  Indeed, 
the standard has allowed many of these laws to pass constitutional muster.  
Such a law may, under Casey, satisfy the undue burden test merely because 
those challenging the law cannot prove definitively that it will actually unduly 
burden women’s access before taking effect.  In this way, the standard 
essentially mandates that every law be challenged as applied, assuring that 
there is no coherent framework or precedential value when the Supreme Court 
strikes down a given restriction.9 
This problem is compounded by the increase in discretionary state 
agency action motivated by hostility toward the abortion right because the 
undue burden standard fails to account for such behavior, no matter how 
prevalent it may be in some states.  District courts are in a position to tease 
out improper legislative motives behind abortion restrictions, but the undue 
burden standard allows courts of appeals to willfully ignore district court 
findings that show improper legislative purpose and instead argue about 
whether the law will impose an undue burden on access in effect.  The 
delegation of authority and discretion to state agencies, like the Missouri 
Department of Health and Senior Services, for example, provides an 
additional smokescreen that enables the courts to feign ignorance about the 
true motivations behind certain restrictive and arbitrary laws. 
 
 6. 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992). 
 7. See Anna North, How Abortion Became a Partisan Issue in America, 
VOX MEDIA (Apr. 10, 2019, 7:30 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2019/4/10/18295513/abortion-2020-roe-joe-biden-
democrats-republicans. 
 8. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874, 878. 
 9. When assessing abortion regulations, courts differentiate between facial 
and as-applied challenges.  A facial challenge is “a claim that a statute is 
unconstitutional on its face, [meaning] that it always operates unconstitutionally.” 
Facial Challenge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  Thus, a facial 
challenge to an abortion regulation may be brought before the regulation takes 
effect.  An as-applied challenge is a claim that a statute, though constitutional on 
its face, is unconstitutional in effect because of “the facts of a particular case or [] 
its application to a particular party.”  As-Applied Challenge, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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Some restrictive measures are motivated by legislatures’ legally 
recognized and legitimate interests in protecting women’s health or protecting 
potential life, but many measures are instead motivated by legislators’ moral 
beliefs about abortion.10  The ability of courts to tease out the real motivation 
behind a law restricting abortion depends on the effectiveness and propriety 
of the legal standard used.  Legal standards – in their formulation or 
interpretation – can be skewed to value one side’s interests over the other’s, 
to turn a blind eye to improper motivations behind restrictive laws, or to 
disregard substantial burdens or benefits faced by one side.  Indeed, these have 
been complaints lodged against the legal standards that have been used to 
review abortion cases.  
With two newly appointed conservative justices, the Supreme Court 
recently struck down another restrictive state abortion law, reiterating that the 
undue burden standard is the proper test.11  This Note discusses how the undue 
burden standard fails to meaningfully protect the abortion right in the current 
polarized political climate.  Part II outlines the relevant history of the legal 
standards used in abortion cases.  Part III illustrates a problematic 
interpretation of the undue burden standard as it relates to the Supreme Court’s 
most recent abortion-related decision in June Medical Services v. Russo.  Part 
IV then discusses how discretionary state agency action in states like Missouri 
exacerbate the problems associated with the legal standard.  Part V concludes 
by reiterating how the undue burden standard has allowed for the gradual 
destruction of the abortion right to near-nonexistence in states like Missouri.  
II. RELEVANT ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE LEADING UP TO THE 
UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD 
While the United States Supreme Court has decided many abortion-
related cases, this section outlines two major decisions that impact the 
standard courts use to assess abortion regulations: Roe v. Wade and Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 
A. Roe v. Wade 
Roe v. Wade is a foundational decision within the United States Supreme 
Court’s abortion jurisprudence.  While courts no longer use the trimester 
framework established in Roe, its essential holding that women have a 
constitutional right to abortion and its careful examination of the 
 
 10. See North, supra note 7. 
 11. Amy Howe, Justices Grant New Cases or Upcoming Term, Will Tackle 
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countervailing interests involved in the abortion debate remain imbedded in 
the standard used today.12   
In the landmark 1973 decision, the Supreme Court struck down as 
unconstitutional a Texas statute that made it a crime to procure or attempt an 
abortion at any stage in pregnancy, except when necessary to preserve the 
woman’s health.13  Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun held that the 
concept of personal liberty found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision to terminate 
her pregnancy.14  He noted, however, that this fundamental privacy right is 
“not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in 
regulation.”15  The Court held that, at certain points in pregnancy, legitimate 
state interests become sufficiently compelling to allow for state regulation of 
the right.16  Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun emphasized that a regulation 
limiting a fundamental right may be justified only by a compelling state 
interest, and regulations “must be narrowly drawn to express only the 
legitimate state interests at stake.”17 
Justice Blackmun continued by analyzing the different state interests at 
play in abortion legislation, their legitimacy, and when – if they are legitimate 
– they may become sufficiently compelling to justify regulation.18  In 
evaluating which interests a state may legitimately have in a woman’s 
abortion decision, the Court looked to three historic justifications for the 
enactment and continued existence of laws criminalizing abortion.19  First, the 
Court found that some of these laws were historically meant to “deter illicit 
sexual conduct.”20  The argument that this could remain an appropriate 
purpose was quickly dismissed, and Texas did not argue that its criminal 
statute was enacted with this purpose.21   
Second, the Court noted that the purpose behind other historic criminal 
abortion laws was to protect women from the hazards once associated with 
the abortion procedure.22  Abortion mortality rates were high when most 
criminal abortion statutes were enacted, especially prior to the development 
of antibiotics in the 1940s, so some states criminalized abortion with the 
purpose of shielding women from the dangers associated with the medical 
 
 12. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878–79. 
 13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973). 
 14. Id. at 153. 
 15. Id. at 154. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 155. 
 18. Id. at 162–63. 
 19. Id. at 147.  Specifically, the Court looked into the history of criminal 
abortion laws because such a law was at issue in the case.  The Texas statute at 
issue made it a crime to “procure” or attempt an abortion, unless the abortion was 
for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.  Id. at 117–18. 
 20. Id. at 148. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at  148–49. 
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procedure.23  However, Justice Blackmun stated that “modern medical 
techniques” at the time of the opinion in 1973, rendered abortion procedures 
at least as safe as childbirth – if not more so – especially when done within 
the first trimester of pregnancy.24  Thus, “any interest of the State in protecting 
the woman from an inherently hazardous procedure . . . [had] largely 
disappeared” by the 1973 decision.25  The Court noted, however, that because 
the risks associated with abortion increase as pregnancy continues, states 
retain a legitimate interest in protecting women’s health and maintaining 
medical standards in later-stage abortions.26  Thus, the Court found that a 
state’s interest in women’s health becomes sufficiently compelling to justify 
regulation after the end of the first trimester.27   
Lastly, the Court examined a state’s interest in protecting life as a 
purpose behind criminal abortion statutes.28  Some criminal abortion statutes 
were enacted with the purpose of allowing states to carry out their general 
interest in protecting the life of their citizens, under the assumption that life 
begins at conception.29  However, Justice Blackmun rejected the notion that 
states have a legitimate interest in protecting life at all stages of pregnancy.30  
Without accepting the notion that life begins at conception, he instead held 
that, “[i]n assessing the State’s interest, recognition may be given to the less 
rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may 
assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone.”31  The 
Court then held that a state’s interest in potential life becomes compelling at 
“viability,” meaning the point at which a fetus is capable of surviving outside 
the womb.32 
Thus, the Roe Court adopted what came to be known as the “trimester 
framework” because, it argued, this was the best way to reconcile a woman’s 
fundamental right to choose to have an abortion with competing legitimate 
state interests.33  Implicit in the trimester framework is the Court’s recognition 
of the notion that a state cannot legitimately further its interests in women’s 
health or potential life when it has no reason to act.  For example, the Court 
looked to the general safety of early stage abortions in 1973 and stated that 
any state interference purporting to further women’s health would not actually 
be furthering a compelling state interest because abortion during the first 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at  149–50. 
 25. Id. at 149. 
 26. Id. at 150. 
 27. Id. at 163. 
 28. Id. at 150. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 163. 
 33. Id. at 154. 
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trimester may already be safer than childbirth.34  Thus, during this period, the 
choice belongs solely to the woman and her physician without interference 
from the state.35  After this period, a state may regulate pursuant to its interest 
in women’s health, so long as the regulation is reasonably related to health.36  
In pursuing its interest in potential life, a state may regulate only after 
viability.37  The Court reasoned that, prior to viability, regulation enacted 
pursuant to a state’s interest in potential life could not actually be furthering 
that goal because the fetus is not yet capable of surviving outside the womb.38  
After viability, a state may regulate or even ban abortion pursuant to its 
interest in potential life.39 
While the Court acknowledged that its trimester framework required 
weighing state interests against a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy,40  
the framework yielded a test more categorical than balancing in practice.41  
Under the framework, viability determined whose interest prevailed, and any 
burden on a woman’s fundamental right prior to certain compelling points 
triggered a strict scrutiny approach, “requiring the government to justify any 
regulation by showing the regulation was narrowly tailored to advance a 
compelling government interest.”42   
The Roe Court’s trimester framework, while rigid, created set 
“categories” for when a state could actually be furthering a legitimate interest 
for an important reason.43  While the boundaries of those categories may have 
been rigid and seemingly arbitrary,44 the framework in essence created a 
presumption of improper state purpose if the state legislated to address a 
problem that did not exist.  This standard, while strict, made it difficult for 
states to legislate unless they had a valid reason to do so.45  Importantly, the 
trimester framework laid out by the Roe Court acknowledged the presence of 
hostility toward the abortion right and crafted a framework that attempted to 
 
 34. Id. at 149, 164. 
 35. Id. at 164. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 163. 
 39. Id. at 164–65 
 40. Id. at 164. 
 41. Brendan T. Beery, Tiered Balancing and the Fate of Roe v. Wade: How 
the New Supreme Court Majority Could Turn the Undue-Burden Standard into A 
Deferential Pike Test, 28 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 403–04 (2019). 
 42. R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
Abortion Rights Law: Strict Scrutiny for Substantial Obstacles on Abortion 
Choice and Otherwise Reasonableness Balancing, 34 QUINNIPIAC L.R. 75, 80 
(2015). 
 43. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155–56, 164–65. 
 44. Becca Kendis, Faute De Mieux: Recognizing and Accepting Whole 
Woman’s Health for its Strengths and Weaknesses, 69 CASE W. RSRV. L.R. 1007, 
1031 (Summer 2019). 
 45. See, e.g., id. at 1013. 
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check such hostility as an impermissible purpose.46  Nineteen years later, in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a plurality of 
justices indicated their willingness to adopt a less strict standard of review to 
state abortion regulations.47 
B. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a 
plurality of justices rejected the trimester framework from Roe, reasoning that 
the framework both misconceived the pregnant woman’s interest and 
undervalued the State’s interest in potential life.48  However, the plurality 
emphasized that, while it was rejecting Roe’s trimester framework, it was 
upholding a central principle of Roe: a woman has the constitutional right to 
choose to have an abortion prior to viability.49  This privacy right, the Court 
recognized, requires “particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted 
to justify its abridgment.”50  However, the plurality found that the trimester 
framework went too far in deeming all pre-viability state regulation 
illegitimate.51  The Court reasoned that the framework’s objective – ensuring 
that the woman’s right not be so subordinate to the State’s interest in 
promoting fetal life that her choice exists in theory but not in fact – could still 
be accomplished with a more lenient standard that would allow the state to 
advance its legitimate interest in potential life prior to viability, an interest the 
Court deemed another central principle of Roe.52   
Thus, the plurality identified viability as the key point in which the 
interests of the state and women shift.53  In doing so, the Court reiterated what 
it considered Roe’s essential three-part holding: (1) before viability, a woman 
has the right to choose to have an abortion without undue interference from 
the State, (2) after viability, the State can restrict abortions if the law contains 
exceptions for pregnancies that endanger the woman’s life or health, and (3) 
“the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in 
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become 
a child.”54  Thus, the Casey Court set forth a new “undue burden standard” 
where a state may regulate pre-viability abortion pursuant to its interests in 
women’s health and potential life from the outset of pregnancy, so long as it 
 
 46. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 116. 
 47. Jon O. Shimabukuro, Abortion: Judicial History and Legislative 
Response 4, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2019). 
 48. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992). 
 49. Id. at 871. 
 50. Id. at 848 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
 51. Id. at 870, 872. 
 52. Id. at 872. 
 53. See id. at 879. 
 54. Id. at 846. 
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did not amount to an undue burden.55  A finding of undue burden, the Court 
clarified, “is shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”56 
In setting forth the new undue burden standard, the Casey plurality 
focused on the test’s application to laws furthering the State’s interest in 
potential life, as this was the purpose behind the informed consent, twenty-
four-hour waiting period, and spousal notification provisions of the 
Pennsylvania statute at issue in the case.57  The Court reasoned that, just 
because a woman has the right to decide to have an abortion prior to viability, 
it does not necessarily follow that a state should be prohibited from ensuring 
that her choice is thoughtful and informed.58  In promoting its interest in 
potential life, “throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure 
that the woman’s choice is informed, and measures designed to advance this 
interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the 
woman to choose childbirth over abortion.”59  The plurality reiterated that 
these measures must not, in purpose or effect, impose a substantial obstacle 
on the woman’s right.60  Thus, under the undue burden standard, ensuring that 
a woman’s choice is properly informed is a reasonable means for states to 
further their legitimate interest in potential life so long as, the Court 
emphasized, those means are solely calculated to inform her decision and not 
hinder it.61  
It is important to note the inherent contradiction in the Casey Court’s 
articulation of its undue burden test.  The Court said that the promotion and 
protection of potential life is an acceptable state purpose, but at the same time 
that a law should not have the purpose of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion.62  When protecting potential life by 
definition involves trying to prevent abortion, this contradiction grants states 
a legitimate interest that they may only partially further under the legal 
standard; states may try to obstacle abortion, but not substantially.63   
This contradiction motivates legislatures to enact gradual, more 
insidious legislation designed to chip away at the abortion right until it no 
 
 55. Id. at 878. 
 56. Id. at 877. 
 57. Five provisions of a Pennsylvania statute were challenged in Casey: an 
informed consent requirement, a waiting period provision requiring a woman to 
receive certain information at least twenty-four hours before an abortion, a 
parental informed consent requirement when a minor seeks an abortion, a spousal 
notification requirement, and a provision exempting compliance with the other 
provisions in the case of medical emergency.  Id. at 844. 
 58. Id. at 872. 
 59. Id. at 878. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 877–78. 
 62. Id. at 877. 
 63. Id. 
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longer exists at all.64  Indeed, anti-abortion legislators and activist groups have 
used this interpretation of the undue burden standard to justify laws that 
gradually chip away at the abortion right as part of a long-term strategy solely 
aimed at ending the right completely.65  While the Roe and Casey Courts 
emphasized the importance of carefully assessing the state purposes asserted 
to justify abortion legislation, the Casey Court’s articulation of the test 
muddies whether lower courts are actually required to conduct a purpose 
inquiry.66  These long-term legislative strategies, and the true purpose behind 
them, go unchecked as seemingly less-threatening individual laws are passed, 
each making the obstacle imposed gradually more substantial.67 
Applying the new undue burden test, the Casey Court upheld four out of 
five of the provisions in question in the Pennsylvania law: a twenty-four-hour 
waiting period requirement, an informed consent provision, a parental consent 
provision, and the recordkeeping and reporting requirements.68  The court 
noted that even though some of these regulations could delay access to an 
abortion or make procuring one more expensive, the State did not impose an 
undue burden in effect, and it was entitled to “enact persuasive measures 
which favor childbirth over abortion.”69 
Interestingly, even though the Court’s articulation of the rule appeared 
to require a law to impose an undue burden neither in effect nor purpose, the 
Court made relatively little inquiry into the State’s purpose behind the 
provisions in question, and instead focused on whether the provisions created 
an undue burden in effect.70  For example, in assessing the State’s purpose 
behind the twenty-four-hour waiting requirement, the Court held the State’s 
purpose to be valid because “in theory, at least, the waiting period [was] a 
reasonable measure to implement the State’s interest in protecting life of the 
unborn, a measure that [did] not amount to an undue burden.”71  Thus, the 
Court assumed that because, theoretically, a waiting period requirement could 
dissuade women from choosing to have an abortion, the State was acting with 
a legitimate purpose.72 
In assessing whether the waiting period requirement imposed an undue 
burden on women’s access to abortion in effect, the Court looked at the district 
 
 64. Olga Khazan, Planning the End of Abortion, THE ATLANTIC (July 16, 
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/what-pro-life-
activists-really-want/398297 [https://perma.cc/68K9-8EFF]. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Thomas Colby, The Other Half of the Abortion Right, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 1043, 1060 (2018) 
 67. Id. at 1045. 
 68. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883, 887, 899–900 (striking down the spousal 
notification provision). 
Id. at 886. 
 70. Id. at 877. 
 71. Id. at 885. 
 72. Id. 
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court’s factual findings relating to the burden imposed by such a law.73  The 
district court found that, “for those women who have the fewest financial 
resources, those who must travel long distances, and those who have difficulty 
explaining their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or others, the 24-hour 
waiting period will be ‘particularly burdensome.’”74  However, the district 
court did not make a finding on whether the burden was undue because it 
never had a chance to address the issue.75   
Using the trimester framework then still in place, the district court struck 
down the waiting period requirement based on the state’s purpose, finding it 
to be a regulation designed to promote the State’s interest in potential life 
before viability, which was prohibited under the trimester framework.76  Thus, 
the Court, looking at the record before it and the fact that the case involved a 
facial challenge where burdens were not yet definitively proven, was not 
convinced that the waiting period requirement imposed an undue burden.77  In 
essence, the Court found that the requirement could theoretically further the 
State’s interest in potential life and that there was not enough proof to show 
that, prior to enforcement, the law would unduly burden women’s access.78 
However, studies have since cast doubt on the accuracy of the Court’s 
conclusions regarding the waiting period requirement.79  According to a 2009 
literature review of scientific studies analyzing the impact of mandatory 
counseling and waiting period laws, such requirements generally do not 
succeed in changing the woman’s mind as Casey assumed, but instead impose 
additional burdens on women that result in more out-of-state and late-term 
abortions.80  The study compared the effects of Mississippi’s mandatory 
counseling and waiting period law, which required an additional in-person 
clinic visit before the procedure, with waiting period laws that allowed 
counseling over the phone or Internet to avoid an additional clinic visit.81  
After the Mississippi law took effect, abortion rates in the state fell, but more 
women began going out-of-state for abortions, and the proportion of second 
 
 73. Id. at 885–86. 
 74. Id. at 886. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 887. 
 78. Id. at 886–87. 
 79. Most Laws Mandating Counseling and Waiting Periods Before Abortion 




 80. Theodore J. Joyce, et al., The Impact of State Mandatory Counseling and 




 81. Id. 
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trimester abortions increased.82  In contrast, abortion rates did not measurably 
change in states where women were permitted to obtain the information 
remotely and avoid a second clinic visit.83  Thus, whether the purpose behind 
waiting period laws can actually be “calculated to inform the woman’s free 
choice [and] not hinder it” is highly questionable when it has been shown that 
the change in reproductive outcomes due to waiting period laws is more likely 
a result of the burden of the requirement to certain women, not women 
changing their minds after being required to take time to think about their 
decision.84  
Moreover, as the district court noted about the situation in Casey, studies 
have shown that requiring that women make two trips to a clinic – one to 
receive information, and another to complete the procedure at least twenty-
four hours later – instead of one imposes additional burdens on some women, 
forcing them to take more time off from work, arrange child care, or spend 
additional money to travel.85  Further, the burden may be compounded by 
other arbitrary targeted regulations of abortion providers (“TRAP laws”) in a 
given state, such as those that require abortion facilities to meet ambulatory 
surgical center (“ASC”) requirements or those that require physicians to 
obtain admitting privileges at a local hospital.86  ASC and admitting privilege 
requirements have caused many clinics to close in states like Missouri and 
Texas.87  Closing clinics forces women to travel greater distances to the 
nearest clinic.88  In these states, a requirement of two visits forces some 
women to even arrange to stay away from home for one or more nights, 
depending on the length of the waiting requirement, due to the great 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. 
 85. Most Laws Mandating Counseling and Waiting Periods Before Abortion 




 86. While abortion providers are already subject to strict evidence-based 
regulations such as licensing requirements, federal workplace safety 
requirements, association requirements and medical ethics, many states have 
imposed additional regulations targeted specifically at abortion clinics that go 
beyond what is necessary to ensure patient safety.  These laws have the primary 
purpose of limiting access to abortion and are referred to as targeted regulations 
of abortion providers, or TRAP laws.  See Targeted Regulation of Abortion 
Providers (TRAP) Laws, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (Jan. 2020), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/evidence-you-can-use/targeted-regulation-abortion-
providers-trap-laws [https://perma.cc/7C2A-QS7M]. 
 87. See id. 
 88. Id. 
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distance.89  However, the burdensome effects of a given law are difficult to 
definitively measure until after the restriction takes effect, making facial 
challenges to laws with a clear purpose of ending the abortion right difficult 
to bring in courts that focus the undue burden analysis on effect.90 
In terms of laws furthering the State’s legitimate interest in women’s 
health, the Casey plurality held that the State may enact regulations to further 
this interest at any point in pregnancy.91  However, “[u]nnecessary health 
restrictions that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle 
to women impose an undue burden.”92 However, because the Court, in 
application, did not give meaningful review to the State’s purpose of potential 
life, some lower courts began to apply less scrutiny in the health restriction 
context, where impermissible purpose is arguably more clear.  This illustrates 
a twofold issue with Casey’s undue burden test: (1) its analysis sets up 
acceptable purposes that are in direct conflict with one another and (2) it 
assumes a case-by-case analysis is necessary, which guarantees endless legal 
battles because every state is different. 
III.  HOW THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD IS UNCLEAR: A LOOK 
INTO THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION BEFORE AND AFTER 
WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH V. HELLERSTEDT  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation 
of the Casey test illustrates the contradictory and confusing nature of the 
undue burden test and how it can ignore hostile legislative tactics.  Further, 
the Fifth Circuit has interpreted the undue burden test to be a state-specific 
analysis, rendering any clarification from the Supreme Court on what 
constitutes an undue burden distinguishable.  The Fifth Circuit’s recent 
abortion decisions involving the undue burden standard are of particular 
relevance here because its articulation of the standard has made its way to the 
Supreme Court on two separate occasions within the last ten years.  
In June Medical Services v. Kliebert, a district court within the Fifth 
Circuit invalidated a Louisiana law requiring physicians to have admitting 
privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the facility where they perform 
abortions, holding that the law posed an undue burden in effect.93  The Fifth 
Circuit then reversed, holding that the law was not an undue burden under its 
 
 89. Most Laws Mandating Counseling and Waiting Periods Before Abortion 




 90. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992). 
 91. Id. at 878. 
 92. Id. 
 93. 158 F. Supp.3d 473, 573 (M.D. La. 2016). 
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interpretation of the standard.94  Later that year, in Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and struck down a 
facially-identical Texas law, holding the admitting privilege requirement in 
that case was an undue burden because it did nothing to benefit women’s 
health but instead made abortions much less accessible to women.95  
In light of Whole Woman’s Health, the Fifth Circuit then remanded June 
Medical Services to the district court for additional factfinding on the 
admitting privileges law in Louisiana.96  The district court again invalidated 
the law as unduly burdensome, finding that the law at issue was facially 
identical to the Texas law invalidated in Whole Woman’s Health and similarly 
furthered no health benefit.97  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district 
court again and dismissed the case, holding that there was at least a minimal 
benefit and the burden was not undue, contrary to the district court’s extensive 
findings.98  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed 
the Fifth Circuit’s decision, again taking issue with the Fifth Circuit’s 
analysis.99 These cases and their implications are more fully discussed below. 
A. The Initial District Court Decision: June Medical Services v. 
Kliebert 
The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Casey’s undue burden test further 
illustrates the problems with the standard.100  In January 2016, the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana was asked in June 
Medical Services v. Kliebert to invalidate a Louisiana law requiring 
physicians to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the 
facility where they perform abortions.101  With Judge deGravelles writing the 
majority opinion, the district court applied what the Fifth Circuit had 
previously deemed to be Casey’s two-pronged test: (1) the law must be 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest, and (2) the law must not have 
 
 94. June Meds. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 814 F.3d 319, 325, 329 (5th Cir. 2016), 
vacated 136 S. Ct. 1354 (2016). 
 95. 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318, 2320 (2016). 
 96. June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Gee, No. 16-30116, 2016 WL 11494731, at 
*1 (5th Cir. Aug. 24, 2016). 
 97. June Med. Servs. LLC v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d 27, 89 (M.D. La. 
2017), rev’d sub nom. June Med Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 727 (5th Cir. 
2018), rev’d sub nom. June Med. Servs. L. L. C.v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103(2020). 
 98. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 815 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. 
granted, 140 S. Ct. 35 (2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 35 (2019), rev’d sub nom. 
June Med. Servs. L.L. C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (plurality opinion). 
 99. June Med. Servs., L.L.C., v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133 (2020) 
(plurality opinion). 
 100. June Med. Servs. v. Kliebert, 158 F.Supp.3d 473, 482–83 (2016). 
 101. Id. at 484. 
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the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking a pre-viability abortion.102 
In assessing the first prong, the district court followed Fifth Circuit 
precedent that admitting privileges are rationally related to women’s health 
and found the first prong to be satisfied.103  The district court then assessed 
the second prong, making a twofold inquiry into both the law’s purpose and 
effect.104  In examining a law’s purpose, the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of 
the rule assumes a valid purpose unless the regulation serves no purpose other 
than to make obtaining abortions more difficult.105  In other words, the 
purpose prong is satisfied as long as the purpose of the law is not solely to 
impose an undue burden.106  The burden is on the plaintiff to show 
impermissible purpose, and the court noted that district courts within the Fifth 
Circuit are not allowed to weigh benefits against burdens under the test.107  
Here, the district court found that one purpose of the admitting privileges law 
was to further women’s health, but that another purpose of the law was to 
make it more difficult for physicians to perform legal abortions and therefore 
restrict women’s access.108  Because there was at least one permissible 
purpose behind the law, the district court found the purpose prong to be 
satisfied.109 
The district court then found that the law imposed an undue burden under 
the effects prong of its undue burden analysis.110  Under the effects prong, the 
law must not have the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of 
women seeking pre-viability abortions.111  Here, the district court made 
extensive factual findings showing that doctors likely would not be able to 
obtain admitting privileges, and that this would cause an undue burden on 
women’s access.112  At the time of the case, five out of the six abortion 
providers in Louisiana had made good faith efforts to obtain admitting 
privileges but were unable to do so because hospitals would either ignore their 
applications until they automatically lapsed or deny applications because of 
the doctors’ statuses as abortion providers.113  The remaining doctor testified 
that he would be forced to stop performing legal abortions if he became the 
sole provider in the state.114  Logistically, the doctor would not be able to 
 
 102. Id. at 524. 
 103. Id. at 529–30. 
 104. Id. at 530–31. 
 105. Id. at 526. 
 106. Id. at 530–31. 
 107. Id. at 526. 
 108. Id. at 505. 
 109. Id. at 530–31. 
 110. Id. at 531. 
 111. Id. at 527. 
 112. Id. at 517–22. 
 113. Id. at 506. 
 114. Id. at 499. 
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accommodate all Louisiana women seeking abortions.115  Further, that doctor 
had already received intense threats from activist groups that would worsen if 
he became the only doctor for groups to focus on.116  Thus, the district court 
invalidated the law because it posed an undue burden in effect.117 
B. The Supreme Court Speaks on the Standard: Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt 
Later in 2016, the Supreme Court, in Whole Woman’s Health, addressed 
the propriety of the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the undue burden test and 
applied it to two Texas laws, an admitting-privileges requirement facially 
identical to the Louisiana admitting-privileges requirement at issue in Kleibert 
and a surgical center requirement.118  The Court waited to address the 
requirements until after they were allowed to go into effect but ultimately 
invalidated both as violations of the undue burden standard under Casey.119  
When the case was first brought, before the law took effect, the Court refused 
to hear the case on the grounds that it was not ripe – without seeing the impact 
that the TRAP laws would have, the Court said it could not determine whether 
there was an undue burden.120  It was only after the law took effect and half 
the clinics closed that the Court was willing to take the case back up again.121   
The admitting-privilege provision at issue required abortion-providing 
physicians to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the 
abortion facility, and the surgical-center provision required abortion facilities 
to meet the minimum standards under Texas law for ambulatory surgical 
centers.122  The Court, with Justice Breyer writing for the majority, held that 
each restriction placed an undue burden on women’s access to abortion and 
invalidated both provisions.123 
In the majority opinion, Justice Breyer began by clarifying certain 
aspects of the undue burden test required by Casey, specifically by explaining 
how the standard used by the Fifth Circuit was incorrect.124  The Fifth 
Circuit’s test found a state law constitutional “if: (1) it [did] not have the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus; and (2) it [was] reasonably related 
to (or designed to further) a legitimate state interest.”125  Justice Breyer 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 498–99. 
 117. Id. at 531. 
 118. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S.Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 2306. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 2300. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 2309. 
 125. Id. 
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critiqued the first component for its focus on the burden imposed without 
including the relevant inquiry into whether the law furthers the State interest 
via a medical benefit, reasoning that “the rule announced in Casey, however, 
requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access 
together with the benefits those laws confer.”126  The Court also clarified that 
rational basis review was incorrect: “[It] is wrong to equate the judicial review 
applicable to the regulation of a constitutionally protected personal liberty 
with the less strict review applicable where, for example, economic legislation 
is at issue.”127 
In invalidating the admitting-privileges requirement, Justice Breyer first 
noted that “there was no significant health-related problem that the new law 
helped to cure,” citing evidence in the record of the particularly low rates of 
complications and virtually nonexistent deaths in Texas due to abortions.128  
Moreover, there was no evidence in the record showing that the new 
requirement would have helped women obtain better treatment.129  Because 
there was no evidence of any health benefit resulting from the new 
requirement, the Court found that the law did not further the State’s legitimate 
interest in protecting women’s health.130  Moreover, the Court stated that 
federal district courts have found other states’ admitting-privileges 
requirements to lack health benefits for similar reasons.131 
Furthermore, Breyer made the second point that, not only does the 
requirement have virtually no benefit, but “the record evidence indicates that 
the admitting-privileges requirement places a ‘substantial obstacle in the path 
of a woman’s choice,’” citing language from Casey.132  Texas hospitals 
conditioned admitting privileges on physicians meeting a certain number of 
admissions per year.133  However, abortions in Texas were so safe that patients 
rarely needed a hospital visit related to the procedure, so physicians were 
almost never able to meet the requirement for admitting privileges.134  After 
the requirement went into effect, the number of abortion facilities dropped in 
half due to the difficulty involved in physicians obtaining admitting 
privileges.135  This resulted in “fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and 
increased crowding.”136  There was also evidence in the record that the 
closures resulted in increased driving distances for women to procure an 
abortion, with the restrictions causing the number of women living more than 
 
 126. Id. (emphasis added).   
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 2310. 
 129. Id. at 2310–11. 
 130. Id. at 2311. 
 131. Id. at 2312. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 2313. 
 136. Id. 
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150 miles from an abortion facility to increase by hundreds of thousands.137  
The Court acknowledged that, while increased driving distances do not always 
rise to the level of placing an undue burden on access, when taken 
cumulatively with the other burdens and weighed against the complete lack of 
health benefits, the law created an undue burden.138  
For similar reasons related to the lack of a health benefit and the extent 
of the burden imposed, the Court also invalidated the surgical-center 
requirement.139  First, the Court, citing the extensive district court findings,140 
found that the restriction provided women with no real health benefit.141  
Because Texas already had extensive safety regulations in place for abortion 
clinics, the surgical-center requirement made no appreciable difference in 
safety.142  Moreover, Texas allowed procedures statistically riskier than 
abortion, like colonoscopies, liposuctions, and at-home childbirth overseen by 
a midwife, to take place outside of hospitals without requiring those facilities 
to be certified as surgical centers.143  The Court also noted that there was 
extensive evidence in the record to support that the restriction provided no real 
health benefit, and there was no evidence to the contrary.144  When weighed 
against the burden of forcing more clinics to close because of the difficulty in 
surgical-center certification, the Court found the requirement imposed an 
undue burden on abortion access.145 
C. The Fifth Circuit’s Analysis after Whole Woman’s Health 
While Whole Woman’s Health was considered a victory for many pro-
choice advocates, its precedential value was limited: the Court treated the 
challenge to Texas’s law as an as-applied challenge.146  It did not strike down 
all admitting privileges requirements or all surgical center certification 
requirements as unduly burdensome, just those in Texas in light of the number 
of clinics that had to close and the increased driving distances imposed on 
 
 137. Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139. Id. at 2316. 
 140. Id. at 2315. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  (Explaining the total number of deaths in Texas from abortions was 
five in the period from 2001 to 2012, or about one out of about 120,000 to 144,000 
abortions.  Nationwide, childbirth is fourteen times more likely than abortion to 
result in death, but Texas law allows a midwife to oversee childbirth in the 
patient’s own home.  Colonoscopy, a procedure that typically takes place outside 
a hospital (or surgical center) setting, has a mortality rate ten times higher than an 
abortion.  The mortality rate for liposuction, another outpatient procedure, is 
twenty-eight times higher than the mortality rate for abortion.). 
 144. Id. at 2316. 
 145. Id. at 2317–18. 
 146. Id. at 2305. 
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women in that state.147  The problem with the limited nature of this holding is 
illustrated by the Fifth Circuit’s reconsideration of Kleibert in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health. 
On remand, the district court laid out a new test in accordance with 
Whole Woman’s Health.148  Under the new test, a restriction must be shown 
to actually further its purported interest, and it is constitutional only if its 
benefits outweigh its burdens, as outlined by Whole Woman’s Health.149  The 
district court, with Judge deGravelles again writing the opinion, granted a 
permanent injunction on the admitting privileges requirement, finding that 
any minimal benefit of the law did not outweigh its substantial burdens.150 
In rendering this decision, the district court made extensive findings of 
fact showing that the admitting privilege requirement was not relevant to the 
standard of care provided to patients, it provided no benefits to women’s 
health, and it was an inapt remedy for a problem that did not exist.151  The 
district court further found that the requirement would likely cause at least 
three of the six abortion clinics in Louisiana to close, which would cause all 
women seeking an abortion in Louisiana to face greater obstacles, with 
additional burdensome effects for several significant subgroups of women in 
Louisiana.152  Thus, after making extensive factual findings and weighing the 
minimal – if not nonexistent – benefits of the law against its significant 
burdens, the district court found the burden to be undue and the law facially 
unconstitutional.153 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit again reversed the district court’s decision 
and dismissed the case, with Circuit Judge Smith writing the majority 
opinion.154  The court held that the factual situation in Louisiana was different 
from the situation in Texas contemplated by the Supreme Court in Whole 
Woman’s Health.155  Even though the laws were facially identical, the court 
found that the law, while declared an undue burden in Texas, would not 
amount to such a burden in Louisiana.156  The court interpreted Casey and 
Whole Woman’s Health to mean that “even regulations with a minimal benefit 
are unconstitutional only where they present a substantial obstacle to 
abortion.”157 
 
 147. Id. at 2297. 
 148. June Medical Services LLC v. Kliebert, 250 F.Supp.3d 27, 33 (M.D. La 
2017). 
 149. Id. at 32. 
 150. Id. at 88. 
 151. Id. at 64. 
 152. Id. at 82. 
 153. Id. at 88–89. 
 154. June Med. Srvs., L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 815 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 155. Id. at 791. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 803. 
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The court found that the law conferred at least a minimal benefit, citing 
legislative testimony showing that there was a difference in the credentialing 
function between clinics and hospitals.158  Unlike in Texas where the 
requirement yielded no additional benefit because abortion clinics were 
already under strict safety regulations, the Fifth Circuit found that abortion 
clinic credentialing in Louisiana was not as rigorous as the process used by 
hospitals.159  Specifically, the record showed evidence that Louisiana abortion 
clinics, apart from requiring physicians to be medically licensed, did not 
inquire into physician competency or perform background checks, whereas 
hospitals did.160  Moreover, evidence also showed that the requirement was 
not targeting abortion procedures while leaving riskier procedure providers 
free from the requirement, as was the case in Whole Woman’s Health.161  
Instead, the court found that the requirement sought to subject abortion 
providers to the same standards that apply to physicians providing similar 
types of services in outpatient surgery centers.162  While the court held that 
there was evidence that the Louisiana law would yield some benefit, it 
acknowledged that the benefit was minor.163 
Thus, the court found that the law was addressing a problem unique to 
Louisiana and bringing abortion physicians up to a baseline standard required 
of other physicians.164  This reasoning is problematic, however, because the 
court of appeals attached a benefit to fixing the difference in credentialing in 
the face of the district court’s explicit finding that fixing the difference 
provided no benefit and addressed no real problem.165  The district court found 
that abortion procedures were already extremely safe in Louisiana, as they 
were in Texas in Whole Woman’s Health, and abortion providers’ competency 
was not an issue in Louisiana.166  However, the court of appeals disregarded 
the district court’s findings on this point and deferred to legislative statements 
asserting a need for the law to protect women’s health.167 
The court of appeals further distinguished the situation in Louisiana from 
Texas in Whole Woman’s Health by finding the law to be less burdensome in 
Louisiana than Texas.168  The court said that it was unclear whether the 
admitting privileges requirement would actually cause clinics to close in 
Louisiana because some of the doctors’ applications had not yet been 
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officially denied, so the doctors could still theoretically obtain privileges.169  
However, the district court explicitly found that hospitals were purposely 
letting the applications sit without formally denying them because Louisiana 
allows for automatic denial if a hospital never addresses an application.170 
In summary, the Fifth Circuit stated that the law would result in a 
potential increased waiting time of fifty-four minutes for, at most, thirty 
percent of women.171  In its holding, the court found that this burden was not 
“substantial” under Whole Woman’s Health, and concluded that the statute 
should be upheld in light of the minimal benefit it would confer.172 
However, the dissent in the Fifth Circuit case, written by Circuit Judge 
Higginbotham, found that the court failed to give meaningful review to the 
burdens and benefits alleged to be conferred by the law due to its disregard of 
the district court’s findings.173  According to the dissent, the law would confer 
no real health benefit because, prior to the law’s passage, abortion physicians 
were required to have a written transfer agreement with a physician who did 
have admitting privileges to a local hospital.174  Thus, the only “benefit” the 
law would confer to women is that, if they require hospital care in the event 
of a complication, which is already a very low percentage of cases, they would 
be able to have continuity of care with their original abortion physician.175  
However, there was no evidence in the district court record that suggested 
women would receive a lesser standard of care in the event of such a 
transfer.176 
Moreover, the dissent criticized the majority’s acceptance of the law’s 
credentialing function as a health benefit, as the district court made no such 
finding.177  The majority rested this finding of benefit on the testimony of one 
doctor who was responsible for hiring physicians at one of the clinics and had 
previously been on a hospital committee that assessed admitting privilege 
applications.178  In his testimony, the doctor described the different hiring 
procedures the majority discussed.179  However, the dissent criticized the 
majority for attaching a benefit to addressing that difference when no evidence 
of such benefit was on the record.180  Moreover, there was no evidence on the 
record that any physician at an abortion facility had been hired with a criminal 
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record or without the proper competency.181  Thus, the dissent argued that, 
like in Whole Woman’s Health, the restriction does not actually further the 
State’s interest in women’s health or proper credentialing because these were 
not issues to begin with.182 
The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s view that the law would 
not be an undue burden on abortion access.183  The district court made 
extensive findings on the likelihood that the six abortion providers in 
Louisiana would be able to obtain admitting privileges.184  The court found 
that only one doctor would be able to obtain admitting privileges, and this 
would result in the inability of approximately seventy percent of the 9,976 
women seeking abortions in Louisiana annually to obtain one.185  This was 
the district court’s more conservative finding of harm, as it made an 
alternative finding of more substantial harm in the likely event that the last 
remaining abortion provider would quit due to fear of being the only abortion 
provider in the state.186  Thus, weighing the likelihood of substantial harm 
against the lack of health benefit using the evidentiary findings of the district 
court, the dissent found this to be a clear undue burden on abortion access.187 
In October 2019, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal of June 
Medical Services and address the constitutionality of the Louisiana admitting 
privileges requirement, its first substantive abortion case since the addition of 
Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh.188  The future of abortion 
jurisprudence now substantially depends on the make-up of the Court.189  
Now, three years after Whole Woman’s Health, Justice Scalia and Justice 
Kennedy are no longer on the bench, and Justice Gorsuch and Justice 
Kavanaugh have taken their places, respectively.190  Prior to Kavanaugh’s 
appointment, some scholars noted the specific importance of Kennedy’s 
position on the Court in terms of Whole Woman’s Health’s power because of 
the importance of his vote to uphold Roe’s essential holding in the Casey  
plurality.191  Indeed, his retirement could place abortion rights in a much more 
precarious position.192  Many have speculated about how the new Supreme 
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Court composition will impact the future of abortion rights, but a definitive 
answer is imminent.  
D. June Medical Services: Another Clarification from the Supreme 
Court 
In June Medical Services v. Russo, Justice Breyer wrote the majority 
opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.193  In addressing 
the merits of the case, the majority first reiterated the proper standard for 
assessing abortion regulations: “a statute which, while furthering a valid state 
interest has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s 
choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate 
ends.”194  Further, “unnecessary health regulations impose an undue burden if 
they have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman 
seeking an abortion.”195  Importantly, the Court emphasized, reiterating 
language from Whole Woman’s Health, that “courts must consider the burdens 
a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws 
confer.”196 
Noting that the Court of Appeals did not take issue with the legal 
standard used by the District Court so much as the factual findings it used in 
reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that “a district court’s findings of 
fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial 
court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”197  This standard is 
highly deferential, and a court of appeals may not reverse a plausible account 
of the evidence given the record, even if it would have weighed the evidence 
differently if it had been sitting as the trier of fact.198 
With that standard in mind, the majority then carefully assessed whether 
the District Court’s findings were sufficient to support its conclusion that the 
Louisiana admitting privileges law is unconstitutional.199  In terms of the 
law’s asserted benefits to women’s health, the Court pointed to the following 
district court findings: 
• Abortion in Louisiana was already “extremely safe, with 
particularly low rates of serious complications” prior to the law’s 
passage.  Further, testimony of clinic staff and physicians showed 
that less than one per several thousand patients ever required 
transfer to a hospital, and “whether or not a patient’s treating 
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physician has admitting privileges is not relevant to the patient’s 
care.”200 
• There was no evidence in the record showing a significant health-
related problem that the new law would help to cure: there was no 
evidence of improper treatment of abortion complications or that 
requiring abortion providers to have admitting privileges would 
help avoid any negative outcomes.201 
The Court then looked to the district court’s findings on the law’s 
burdensome effects: 
• “Approximately 10,000 women obtain abortions in Louisiana 
every year[,]” and “those women were served by six doctors at 
five abortion clinics” at the outset of the litigation.  By the time 
the district court rendered its second decision, there were five 
doctors and three clinics remaining.202 
• Despite the good faith efforts of the five doctors to obtain 
admitting privileges in order to comply with the law, they had 
“very limited success for reasons related to [the law] and not 
related to their competence.”203 
• The doctors’ inability to obtain admitting privileges was caused 
by the new law “working in concert with existing laws and 
practices, including hospital bylaws and criteria that preclude or, 
at least greatly discourage, the granting of privileges to abortion 
providers.”204  
• It is unlikely that the clinics would be able to recruit new 
physicians who have or could obtain admitting privileges.205 
Enforcing the admitting privileges requirement would therefore 
“reduc[e] the number of clinics to one, or at most two, and leav[e] only one, 
or at most two, physicians providing abortions in the entire state.”206 
Taken together, the evidence shows that the law “does not advance 
Louisiana’s legitimate interest in protecting the health of women seeking 
abortions.  Instead, [the law] would increase the risk of harm to women’s 
 
 200. Id. at 2114–15. 
 201. Id. at 2115. 
 202. Id. 
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 206. Id. at 2115–16. 
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health by dramatically reducing the availability of safe abortion in 
Louisiana.”207 
The Court also noted that the district court found no distinction between 
this case and Whole Woman’s Health because the Louisiana law was modeled 
after the Texas admitting privileges requirement and they both operate by 
imposing “significant obstacles to abortion access with no countervailing 
benefits.”208 
The Court concluded that, in light of the record, “the District Court’s 
significant factual findings—both as to burdens and as to benefits—have 
ample evidentiary support” and “none is ‘clearly erroneous.’”209  The majority 
further concluded that “[t]his case is similar to, nearly identical with, Whole 
Woman’s Health.  And the law must consequently reach a similar conclusion.  
Act 620 is unconstitutional.”210 
In both June Medical Services and Whole Woman’s Health, the laws in 
question were ostensibly enacted out of the States’ interest in safeguarding 
women’s health.  Thus, these types of laws are commonly referred to as 
“health restrictions.”211  Indeed, stemming from Roe and rearticulated 
specifically in Casey, states have a legitimate interest in preserving women’s 
health from the outset of pregnancy.212  However, many scholars have noted 
that Whole Woman’s Health significantly diminished the validity of health 
restrictions due to the Court’s recognition that abortion is generally a much 
safer procedure today than it was in the Roe era.213  June Medical Services 
now bolsters that conclusion.  It follows, then, that states likely can no longer 
justify health restrictions “rely[ing] on general claims regarding the dangers 
of abortion.”214  
In June Medical Services, Louisiana seemed to address this issue by 
citing an existing gap in abortion facility regulations that the health restriction 
would alleviate.215  This was successful with the Fifth Circuit majority.216  The 
court reasoned that, unlike in Whole Woman’s Health where the State showed 
no evidence of health benefit, Louisiana had at least provided some evidence 
that “the admitting privileges requirement performs a real, and previously 
unaddressed, credentialing function that promotes the well-being of women 
 
 207. Id. at 2116. 
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 209. Id. at 2132. 
 210. Id. at 2133. 
 211. John A. Robertson, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and the Future 
of Abortion Regulation, 7 UC IRVINE L. R. 623, 645 (December 2017). 
 212. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992). 
 213. Robertson, supra note 211, at 645; Becca Kendis, Faute De Mieux: 
Recognizing and Accepting Whole Woman’s Health for its Strengths and 
Weaknesses, 69 CASE W. RES. L.R. 1007, 1027 (Summer 2019). 
 214. Kendis, supra note 213, at 1025. 
 215. June Med. Srvs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 807 (2018). 
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seeking abortion.”217  However, the court differed from Casey and Whole 
Woman’s Health, as the dissent noted, in assuming the additional regulation 
would actually provide a benefit to women’s health, which the district court 
specifically found it did not.218  In Whole Woman’s Health and June Medical 
Services, the Court emphasized the constitutional duty imposed on courts in 
reviewing factual findings when constitutional rights are at stake.  The Court’s 
thorough analysis of the lower court’s findings and records in both cases 
further supports this duty.219 
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A STATE-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS: A LOOK 
INTO MISSOURI  
The Missouri Legislature has delegated broad authority to the 
Department of Health and Senior Services (“DHSS”) in regulating abortion 
facilities.  However, Missouri lawmakers have used DHSS to make obtaining 
an abortion more difficult in Missouri. 
A. Adding on to the Smokescreen: Delegations of Authority to 
Missouri Agencies and Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Lyskowski 
The Supreme Court’s state-specific analysis of state TRAP laws 
becomes even more complicated when a state delegates the authority to 
regulate abortion to an agency that exercises broad authority.220  In Missouri, 
for example, a state that has a codified legislative intent to restrict abortion to 
the fullest extent possible,221 the legislature has given broad authority to 
DHSS in regulating abortion facilities.222  DHSS is tasked with adopting rules, 
regulations, and standards by which abortion facilities must abide;223 issuing 
 
 217. Id. at 806. 
 218. Id. at 816 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
 219. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016). 
 220. Rosemary Westwood, How State Health Departments Are Closing 
Abortion Clinics: Five Key Takeaways, PACIFIC STANDARD, Jul. 31, 2019, 
https://psmag.com/news/how-state-health-departments-are-closing-abortion-
clinics-five-key-takeaways. 
 221. MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.010 (West 2019) (“In recognition that Almighty 
God is the author of life, that all men and women are ‘endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life’, and that article I, 
section 2 of the Constitution of Missouri provides that all persons have a natural 
right to life, it is the intention of the general assembly of the state of Missouri to: 
(1) Defend the right to life of all humans, born and unborn; (2) Declare that the 
state and all of its political subdivisions are a “sanctuary of life” that protects 
pregnant women and their unborn children; and (3) Regulate abortion to the full 
extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States, decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court, and federal statutes.”). 
 222. See MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 197.225–197.230 (West 2017). 
 223. MO. ANN. STAT. § 197.225 (West 2017). 
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licenses, without which abortion facilities may not operate;224 and conducting 
on-site inspections and investigations of facilities “as it deems necessary.”225  
Additionally, the legislature requires DHSS to conduct unannounced on-site 
inspections and investigations of abortion facilities at least once a year.226  
While much of the statutory language relating to the licensing of medical 
treatment facilities refers to both abortion facilities and ambulatory surgical 
centers, this on-site, unannounced investigation requirement is specific only 
to abortion facilities.227 
DHSS’s discretionary treatment of abortion facilities has been the 
subject of several lawsuits within the last five years.228  In July 2015, the 
Missouri Senate convened the Interim Committee on the Sanctity of Life to 
investigate Planned Parenthood’s presence in Missouri.229  The Committee 
focused on the licensing of Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-
Missouri’s (“PPKM”) Columbia, Missouri facility and the hospital admitting 
privileges held by the sole physician performing abortions there.  Missouri 
law requires physicians who perform abortions at an abortion facility to obtain 
admitting privileges at a hospital within fifteen minutes of the facility in order 
for the facility to receive a license from DHSS.230  The Committee determined 
that PPKM’s physician held privileges at University of Missouri Health Care 
under the hospital’s “refer and follow” category of privileges.231   
In August 2015, then-Senator and Chairman of the Committee on 
Sanctity of Life Kurt Schaefer, sent a letter to the University of Missouri 
Chancellor reminding him that the University, a publicly funded entity in a 
state with citizens who “have gone to great lengths to ensure that their 
taxpayer dollars never enable abortion services,” received half of one billion 
taxpayer dollars from the State of Missouri the previous year.232  He cautioned 
that the University’s agreement with PPKM’s physician was “a matter of 
substantial public interest and concern.”233  Senator Schaefer, also a member 
of the Senate Appropriates Committee, further cautioned that the University 
may be in violation of Missouri law prohibiting the use of public funds for the 
assistance or promotion of abortion procedures.234   
 
 224. Id. at  § 197.205.) 
 225. Id. at  § 197.230 (West 2017). 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id.  
 228. See Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Lyskowski, 2016 WL 2745873 
(W.D. Mo. 2016); Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. 
Hawley, 903 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 229. Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Lyskowski, 2016 WL 2745873, at *2 
(W.D. Mo. 2016). 
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26
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss4/10
2020] THE SMOKESCREEN PROBLEM IN ABORTION LAW 1165 
In response, the University announced on September 24 that it would 
eliminate the “refer and follow” category of privileges held by PPKM’s 
physician effective December 1.235  The following day, DHSS Administrator 
John Langston sent a letter to PPKM stating that the facility’s license would 
be revoked effective December 1 if the facility’s physician did not obtain 
admitting privileges at a nearby hospital by then.236  On November 25, 
Langston sent PPKM another letter stating that DHSS had not received 
confirmation that PPKM was able to satisfy the admitting privileges 
requirement essential to its license and that DHSS would now revoke the 
center’s license effective close of business on November 30.237 
After PPKM obtained a preliminary injunction to prevent DHSS from 
revoking their facility license in November, the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Missouri assessed the propriety of a permanent 
injunction in April 2016 in Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Lyskowski.238  
The District Court granted the permanent injunction, and Judge Laughrey, 
writing for the majority, found that DHSS, in denying PPKM’s license, 
violated the Equal Protection Clause by treating PPKM more harshly than 
other similarly situated ASCs.239   
Missouri law outlines a procedure for DHSS to follow when a facility is 
found not to be in compliance with licensing requirements.  The procedure 
generally involves DHSS identifying a deficiency, notifying the facility of the 
deficiency, undergoing a course of communication with the facility that 
allows the facility time and opportunity to implement a plan of correction to 
address the deficiency, and then deciding whether license revocation is 
appropriate.240  Judge Laughrey noted that PPKM was not given an 
opportunity to implement a plan of correction before DHSS revoked its 
license, and “[o]ther than the PPKM revocation that is the subject of this 
litigation, there is no instance in DHSS records involving an ASC license 
revocation without a plan of correction being put in place first.”241   
Judge Laughrey further noted that DHSS had rarely revoked ASC 
licenses, with only one other instance of DHSS attempting to revoke such a 
license found in the record.242  In that case, DHSS identified numerous serious 
deficiencies that posed “significant threats to patient health and safety” at the 
Surgical Center of Creve Coeur (“SCCC”), including failing to ensure that 
drugs used at the center were securely maintained, allowing untrained nurses 
to provide conscious sedation, failing to follow acceptable infection control 
standards, and failing to ensure that its nursing staff was aware of the location 
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of the emergency resuscitative equipment.243  Despite these egregious 
deficiencies, SCCC was allowed to retain its license during the period of 
deficiency and submit several plans of correction over the course of two 
years.244  DHSS made a “substantial effort with SCCC to remedy the 
deficiencies, involving numerous back and forth communications with 
SCCC.”245  After DHSS worked with SCCC for years to try to correct the 
serious deficiencies with no success, DHSS then made the decision to revoke 
the center’s license.246 
In contrast, DHSS made the decision to revoke PPKM’s license based 
on a single impending deficiency without soliciting a plan of correction or 
allowing PPKM time to address the deficiency.247  Instead, “DHSS informed 
PPKM that it had made its decision about how to address the deficiency, and 
planned to revoke the center’s license as soon as the deficiency arose.”248  
DHSS admitted that, unlike SCCC, PPKM’s failure to obtain admitting 
privileges presented no immediate threat to patient health or welfare because 
PPKM stopped performing abortions when its physician’s hospital privileges 
expired.249  The court found DHSS’s disparate treatment of SCCC and PPKM 
irrational because “[t]here is no question that SCCC’s safety deficiencies 
made the center less deserving of DHSS leeway in developing and 
implementing a plan of correction than does PPKM’s single deficiency, which 
DHSS admits presents no immediate threat to patient welfare.”250  Yet SCCC 
was given significantly more opportunities to communicate with DHSS than 
PPKM, and the court found this type of irrational disparate treatment violative 
of the Equal Protection Clause.251 
Further, “PPKM had no deficiency at the time DHSS sent its September 
25 and November 25 notices,” and DHSS had never undertaken a prospective 
analysis of impending deficiencies prior to PPKM, according to the record.252  
The court found that “such hasty action is not contemplated by the 
enforcement statute.”253  
Further, Judge Laughrey found that “DHSS’s unprecedented hasty 
actions were likely the result of political pressure being exerted by Missouri 
legislators and the Department’s perception that if it did not act in accordance 
with the legislature’s desires, its budget would be cut.”254  Mr. Langston 
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suggested that DHSS feared financial retaliation from Senator Schaefer, as a 
member of the Senate Appropriates Committee, if it did not “act in accordance 
with the senator’s goals.”255   
While Mr. Langston, who would normally be in charge of drafting and 
overseeing plans of corrections, sent the notices to PPKM, they were drafted 
by higher-ups in this case, which was unlike DHSS’s normal practices.256  All 
decisions about plans of correction are generally made by “bureau-level” 
DHSS employees who conduct ASC surveys, such as Mr. Langston, so the 
court noted that the involvement of the DHSS Director and Office of the 
Governor in PPKM’s case was unusual and indicated that the course of action 
taken resulted from animus towards PPKM as an abortion facility.257  Judge 
Laughrey found that DHSS’s disparate treatment of PPKM “[could not] be 
justified by political pressure or public opposition to PPKM,” and that the 
concept of equal protection dictates that “a bare [legislative] desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government 
interest.”258 
B. Illustrating the Problems with a State-Specific Analysis: 
Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Hawley 
While Judge Laughrey’s holding in Lyskowski checked improper state 
agency action motivated by animus towards abortion facilities, the same 
animus has gone unchecked in other lawsuits involving DHSS due to the 
application of the undue burden standard.259  Comprehensive Health of 
Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Hawley, an opinion written by Judge 
Shepherd of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, is one 
example.260  In that case, Comprehensive Health and Reproductive Health 
Services of Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region (“RHS”), together 
representing every facility that provided or sought to provide abortions in 
Missouri,261  sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of 
the Missouri legislature’s 2007 statutory amendment to the definition of 
ambulatory surgical centers to include abortion facilities.262   
The amendment resulted in a statutory requirement that all physicians 
performing abortions have admitting privileges at a hospital within fifteen 
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minutes of the facility, the same type of restriction at issue in Whole Woman’s 
Health and June Medical Services.263  Additionally, pursuant to its authority 
to enact health and safety regulations for abortion facilities, DHSS 
subsequently adopted regulations that specify physical design and layout 
requirements for abortion facilities performing surgical abortions, known as 
physical plant regulations.264  These regulations include a waiver provision 
allowing facilities to waive the requirements, pending a written request and 
DHSS approval of the waiver.265  Comprehensive Health and RHS challenged 
both the admitting privileges requirement and the physical plant regulations 
on substantive due process and equal protection grounds, arguing that Whole 
Woman’s Health made both laws unconstitutional and unenforceable.266 
The district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the admitting 
privileges requirement and the physical plant regulations solely on due 
process grounds, finding that Whole Woman’s Health controlled its ruling.267  
The district court found the opinion in Whole Woman’s Health to be so clear 
on the unconstitutionality of admitting privilege requirements that it went so 
far as to liken Missouri’s advocacy of these TRAP laws to an “attempt to 
undermine Brown v. Board of Education.”268 
In assessing the claims in the Eighth Circuit, Judge Shepherd addressed 
each requirement separately.269  Beginning with the physical plant regulations, 
the court did not agree with the lower court that a facial challenge to the 
regulations was justiciable at that point in time.270  The Eighth Circuit, 
interpreting Whole Woman’s Health similarly to the Fifth Circuit in June 
Medical Services, focused on the burden component of the undue burden test 
and emphasized the “fact-intensive nature of the constitutional test.”271  The 
court found that there was not enough information in the record on how 
flexible DHSS would be in allowing waivers to show whether the physical 
plant regulations would actually amount to an undue burden.272  There was 
only one previous instance of a request for a waiver in the record, so the court 
found that a decision on the facial challenge was premature.273  
The court further held that the district court committed an error of law 
by making a decision on the facial challenge to the physical plant 
regulations.274  Judge Shepherd reasoned that the district court “enjoined the 
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regulations on the presumption that a DHSS Director would act less than 
scrupulously on any waiver application,” and emphasized that “the good faith 
of [state] officers and the validity of their actions are presumed.”275  After 
Lyskowski, the foundation of this presumption seems questionable.   
Moving to the next requirement at issue, Judge Shepherd held that the 
district court also erred in enjoining the admitting privileges requirement 
because “[it] did not apply the plain language of [Whole Woman’s Health v.] 
Hellerstedt,” which, the court reasoned, requires courts to consider the 
burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those 
laws confer.276  Explaining that Whole Woman’s Health did not find that 
abortion was inherently safe in all states as a matter of law, Judge Shepherd 
held that the district court was required to make factual findings on whether 
the law was medically beneficial in order to adequately weigh benefits against 
burdens, because that inquiry might yield a different result in Missouri versus 
Texas.277  The district court discussed the complete lack of health benefit 
conferred by the requirement, but the Court of Appeals read Whole Woman’s 
Health to require a somehow more in-depth inquiry.278 
Interestingly, both Hawley and June Medical Services involve this same 
issue: the undue burden standard allows appellate courts to disregard the fact-
finding of lower courts, which are better suited to make burden 
determinations.  Both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have taken the view that 
the legislatures were motivated by something other than the obvious desire to 
eliminate all access to abortion in their respective states, in the face of codified 
legislative intents to do just that. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Even though the Columbia Health Center of PPKM succeeded in 
keeping its license in the 2016 Lyskowski case, it ended up losing its license 
in October 2018 after failing to meet the admitting privileges requirement.279  
Lyskowski addressed the flagrant disparate treatment of PPKM by DHSS, but 
it was not able to address the constitutionality of the DHSS requirements 
themselves.280  Thus, the more insidious, long-term strategy implemented by 
the Missouri Legislature has gone largely unchecked.  While Missouri had 
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five abortion clinics in 2008, that number dwindled to one by 2020.281  As 
further evidence of the strategy to completely end abortion in Missouri, DHSS 
was recently involved in litigation over its failed attempt to deny the license 
of Missouri’s sole remaining abortion provider.282  While the license of its 
sole clinic remains intact, Missouri narrowly escaped becoming the first state 
without a single abortion provider since 1974.  
Planned Parenthood officials have been warning courts about this result 
for years.  The director of state media campaigns for Planned Parenthood, 
Bonyen Lee-Gilmore, explained that “[t]his has been several decades’ worth 
of work by politicians who are passing medically unnecessary restrictions and 
working with their political appointees who enforce regulation.  They have 
picked off health center after health center, pushing care out of reach for far 
too many people.  This has been a slow chipping away, a long-term strategy 
by anti-abortion forces in the state who have planned a long arc to this day.”283  
Surely not having a single abortion facility in Missouri would amount to a 
substantial obstacle to Missouri women seeking abortions, but the undue 
burden standard, in its failure to meaningfully review legislative purpose 
behind a restriction, has allowed for this gradual result while courts have 
watched it happen. 
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